I. INTRODUCTION Krishnaswamy, a thirteen-year-old Indian boy, innocently stirs a hot pan of molten lead left over from a used car battery imported from the west.' Like most workers engaged in the hazardous waste recycling industries in many developing Asian countries, he is economically dependent upon the potentially deadly practice. 2 While industrial world leaders influence powerful industrialized nations like Australia, Canada, 3 and the United States 4 to continue dumping their waste cheaply in India and other developing nations, the ratification of the Basel Ban remains uncertain. Australia, although a ratifying member of the Basel Convention, 7 has refused to ratify the recent Ban Amendment to the Convention on the Transboundary Movement of Hazardous Waste' and attempts to continue its waste trade with the Ban Amendment undermine the spirit of the Basel Convention. Greenpeace International" 8 alleges continued hazardous waste exportation in contravention of the ban.' 9 Australia, among the worst offenders and most vocal opponents of the ban decision, demonstrates why the Ban Amendment is a necessary and integral part of the Basel Convention and why an international convention that purports to control hazardous waste transportation, disposal, and reclamation without the ban would fail to accomplish its original goals.
Part II of this note outlines the Basel Convention of 1989, highlighting its key provisions to explain how each works toward the Convention's overall purpose. Part II also discusses the Basel Ban Amendment in the context of the Convention and explains its inception, necessity, and relevance given hazardous waste trade realities. Part III chronicles Australia's efforts and the efforts of other OECD nations to use article 11 and the expansion of Annex VII to circumvent the Ban Amendment restrictions on free trade in hazardous waste. Part III also raises and counters industry arguments criticizing the ban as a violation of international free trade provisions, emphasizing Australia's particular responsibilities as a Convention member in view of the vulnerabilities of developing countries. Part IV describes the enforcement and liability scheme and adjudication process under the Convention, comparing it to the Australian liability scheme and suggesting solutions to the inherent difficulties of policing an international ban on the movement of hazardous wastes. This note concludes that the Ban Amendment is a necessary addition to the Basel Convention, deserving of enforcement, and neither amenable to circumvention through the use of article 11 agreements nor subject to compelling criticism from a free trade perspective.
II. BACKGROUND OF THE BASEL CONVENTION

A. 1989 Basel Convention
The Basel Convention was first conceived in 1989 and entered into force in 1992 to regulate the transboundary movement of hazardous wastes 19. See generally Waste-Trade Zealots, supra note 9.
[Vol. 9:2 from and between the now 12120 member nations. 2! The Convention responded to the effect of tightening industrial waste laws that prompted industrialized nations to engage in the international hazardous waste trade.
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Prior to the Basel Convention's development, the OECD played a significant role in developing legal requirements governing the hazardous waste trade.' The Basel Convention now defines which materials constitute hazardous waste and establishes rules for transporting and recycling those materials. 4 The Convention also seeks to establish each specific nation's responsibility for its own import and export of hazardous materials by restricting the transnational flow of hazardous material and by creating incentives to control the creation of hazardous waste. 25 The Convention accomplishes its goals through two key provisions. Article 4 outlines Convention members' obligations in general. Article 4 requires an exporting state to notify a prospective importing state of any transboundary movement of hazardous waste. 26 The information must be "sufficiently detailed" to allow the importing state to make a proper risk assessment. 27 Because the Convention allows parties to pass national legislation banning all hazardous waste imports, parties to the Convention may not export their hazardous waste to nations choosing to institute such bans.' Parties must also forbid export to an importing nation if it has reason to believe that the importer will not manage the waste "in an environmentally sound manner."' In addition, article 4 insulates parties from receiving hazardous waste from non-parties and prevents parties from exporting to non-parties.° Other general obligations include requiring: (1) the exporting nation to ensure that it minimizes its hazardous and other waste generation; 31 (2) the importing nation to possess "environmentally sound" disposal or recycling facilities and to exercise the same such management practices; 32 and (3) the cooperation and sharing of information regarding "the transboundary movement of hazardous wastes ... in order to improve the environmentally sound management of such wastes and to achieve the prevention of illegal traffic." 33 Article 4(10) further prevents the exporting purpose of the Basel Convention is to establish state responsibility for hazardous waste transfers." id. at 49. "The Convention attempts to regulate waste movements by imposing restrictions because, as emphasized in the preamble, restrictions reduce transfrontier movements, and provide incentives for sound waste management." Id. at 46. Iwona Rummell-Bulska, acting Basel Secretariat, characterized the goals of the Basel Convention as being: "to prevent to the extent possible and minimize the generation of hazardous wastes; treat and dispose of such wastes in such a way that they do not cause harm to health and the environment; and eliminate or reduce transboundary movements of hazardous wastes to a minimum." Wolff, supra note 18, at 30.
26. See Basel Convention 1989, art. 4(2)(f). [Vol. 9:2 state from shirking its obligations under other provisions of the Convention by improperly imposing its obligations upon the importing state. 34 Article 6 of the Basel Convention governs the movement of hazardous waste between parties. Its prior informed consent provision requires the exporting state to notify the importing state in writing of the hazardous qualities of the materials to be shipped. 35 A contract between the two must be formed "specifying environmentally sound management" of the hazardous wastes. 36 If any of the Basel Convention's notification and consent provisions are not followed, if the documents provided to the importing state misrepresent actual waste contents, or if the disposal is conducted by either the exporting or importing nation, or both, in violation of the Convention or other international law, such activities are deemed "illegal traffic" and are subject to criminal penalties developed nationally by each ratifying party. 37 Australia signed the Basel Convention in 1989 and passed enabling legislation entitled the Hazardous Waste (Regulation of Exports and Imports) Act soon thereafter. 3 " Australia later ratified the Convention in 1992. 19 Because of the government's belief that the Hazardous Waste Act proved deficient when compared with the "mainstream of international opinion, " ' the Act was amended in 1996 to widen its scope to regulate hazardous waste intended for recycling or recovery and to impose greater penalties upon individuals and corporations engaging in illegal hazardous waste trade. 41 The Act's objectives appear to be in accord with the Basel 
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Convention 42 but lend greater emphasis to the continued existence of article 11 agreements. The amended Act attempts "to give effect to the Basel Convention.. . and. . . to give effect to agreements and arrangements of the kind mentioned in Article 11 of the Convention. " 43 The Australian law also codifies the Basel Convention's prior informed consent provision.' M Australia's Environment Minister generally acts as gatekeeper to the granting of export or import permits to individuals or corporations.
4 5 For example, the Minister may consider an applicant's financial viability, his previous environmental record, and "any other relevant matters. "I The Minister must also be satisfied that the proposal is "consistent with the environmentally sound management of the hazardous waste," 47 that prior informed consent was given, 48 and that the applicant has adequate insurance. 49 However, even if the above conditions are satisfied, the Minister may still refuse to grant the permit if doing so would be "in the public interest,"5° or if there is another way of handling the waste that does not "pose a significant risk of injury or damage to human beings or the environment" 5 and doing so domestically would be safe, efficient and "consistent with the environmentally sound management of the waste." 5 2
The Act discourages exports intended for final disposal by requiring that permits for these exports only be granted in "exceptional circumstances. 53 42. Section 3(1) of the Amendment states:
The object of this Act is to regulate the export, import and transit of hazardous waste to ensure that exported, imported or transited waste is managed in an environmentally sound manner so that human beings and the environment, both within and outside Australia, are protected from the harmful effects of the waste. Hazardous Waste Act 1989, § 3(1).
See also Basel Convention 1989, art. 6. 45. See id. § 13. A Basel Export Permit must include, but is not limited to, the following information: (1) the kind and quantity of the hazardous waste to be exported; (2) the method, time and place of transport; (3) the method of dealing with the waste to be used after export; and (4) the facility used in disposal and process after export. [Vol. 9:2 Thus, the Australian Hazardous Waste Act appears to codify and strengthen the purposes of the Basel Convention prior to the Ban Amendment. However, nowhere does the Act state that Australia must manage its hazardous waste with an eye toward minimizing or prohibiting movement to developing countries because of the risks that such activities pose to developing countries. The Ban Amendment, if ratified, would require Australia and every other Convention member to implement this prohibition into national legislation.
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B. The Ban Amendment
The need for the ban on waste exported from OECD to non-OECD nations grew evident because developing nations with nonexistent or less stringent hazardous waste laws were being inundated with waste from OECD member nations. 5 Accordingly, the Third Conference of the Parties, in its decision and amendment, "[r]ecogniz[ed] that transboundary movements of hazardous wastes, especially to developing countries, have a high risk of not constituting an environmentally sound management of hazardous wastes as required by this Convention. "56 The Ban Amendment to the Basel Convention was first agreed to by Convention consensus on March 25, 1994.1 7 Effective January 1, 1998, the amendment imposed a further ban on hazardous waste exports from OECD to non-OECD nations, making it more difficult for industrialized nations to ignore their obligations to dispose of or recycle their waste responsibly. 58 A coalition of developing countries first proposed the ban at the First Conference of the Parties. 59 The coalition pushed for a consensus to institute the ban at the Second Conference, and Denmark joined the developing countries in moving to implement the ban decision into the Convention by Economically, the ban decision shifts the burden of enforcement from developing countries (which previously were able to initiate unilateral bans on waste imports under the Convention) to wealthy OECD nations where the waste originates. 62 The ban further closes "the recycling loophole" through which ninety percent of the hazardous waste trade schemes fell by encompassing not only goods destined for final disposal, but also goods labeled for recycling or reclamation. 63 By the end of 1994, one hundred three developing countries had instituted prohibitions upon hazardous waste imports whether destined for "recycling" or "final disposal."' However, Asian countries lagged behind, becoming even more desirable targets for OECD nations' disposal and recycling business. 6 voting at the Third Conference, 76 only seventeen countries 77 had ratified the ban as of February 1998.78 Part of this failure to ratify may be attributed to confusion sparked by Australian and Canadian demands for clarification of the types of hazardous waste included in the Convention and, therefore, excluded from export by the ban. 9 In response, at the Fourth Conference of the Parties, the Technical Working Group adopted two separate lists of wastes in order to clarify what wastes were considered hazardous under the Basel Convention for the purposes of the ban.' Australia responded to the concerns of Greenpeace at a national Policy Reference Group meeting by stating that regardless of the clarification of what materials would be considered hazardous wastes, Australia had merely promised to "consider" whether or not to ratify the amendment once the hazardous waste issue was resolved. 8 79. See Statement Made by Australia, supra note 75, at 100. In a statement by Australia following the adoption of the Ban Amendment, the Australian delegate stated that, "Australia ... will only consider ratifying the amendment when the work on the definition of hazardous characteristics is completed to our satisfaction." Id. [Vol. 9:2 citing the need to perform an economic assessment of the ban decision with regard to the new hazardous waste classification system. 8 2 Another explanation for some countries' failure to ratify the ban may reside in the United States' lack of support as evidenced by its failure to either sign or ratify the Convention. In addition, because of many economic and social incentives to maintain a hazardous waste export relationship between OECD and non-OECD members, and because of pressure from the International Chamber of Commerce,' compliance with the terms of the Convention ban is, and will continue to become, a major international policing issue. Specifically, the scrap metal industry opposes the ban and continues to lobby non-OECD nations to break from the non-OECD alliance that supports the ban.' Further, ban opponents8 6 continue to assert pressure upon G-77 developing nations to withdraw their support of the ban, pressure other countries to withdraw, or to enter into bilateral hazardous waste trade agreements, or all 
See Trade Measures in the Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes and Their
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three.' In order to accomplish their objectives, nations opposed to the Ban Amendment employ a variety of tactics.
III. EFFORTS TO UNDERMINE THE BAN AMENDMENT
A. Australian Resistance
Industrialized nations such as the United States, Australia, and Canada are pushing vigorously to undermine the ban. 88 Many waste schemes involving developing countries existed before the ban came into effect and may not magically dissipate without fear of reprisal. Australia, in particular, continues exporting hazardous waste to developing countries who are more than willing to accept the waste at costs far lower than Australia's domestic disposal or recycling operations cost. 89 Australia's actions illustrate that industrial nations who are opposed to the ban can continue to find ways to export waste to Third World countries through legal loopholes in the Convention. To further complicate matters, a few non-OECD nations want to either accept the waste or be included in Annex VII despite their lack of adequate treatment facilities. 9° Seeking to take advantage of political and economic vulnerability, Australia and other ban opponents organized a meeting with developing countries in March of 1995, in Dakar, Senegal. 9 ' Greenpeace characterized the meeting as a "disguised attempt by some rich countries to destroy the ban [ Following the ban's adoption, Australia instituted an international campaign to convince developing nations to sign waste trade agreements in order to rally and defeat ratification of the ban. In October of 1994, five months after the ban decision was originally made, 94 Australian government officials held meetings with the Indian, Malaysian, and Indonesian governments to ask that they accept toxic waste from Australian companies.' Australian officials also approached the South African government in 1995,96 before the Basel Ban came into effect, to encourage it to reconsider its support for the proposed ban. ' Along with these attempts to thwart Ban Amendment ratification, Australian industrial hazardous waste exporters have continued dumping hazardous waste in the world's poorer nations under the guise of "recycling," a practice previously permitted under the Convention. Although the ban on exportation came into effect in January of 1998, reports from Greenpeace allege that Australia, Canada, the United States, and other OECD countries continue exporting their waste to non-OECD nations in order to save money. Greenpeace specifically cited waste "schemes" involving the United States, Canada, Australia, the Netherlands, and Germany and the export of hazardous waste to India, Brazil, Bangladesh, the Philippines, and China. 9 Presently, Greenpeace accuses Australia of hazardous waste trading with various developing countries not equipped to handle the waste without endangering the health and environment of their citizens. 99 These allegations include: (1) twenty tons of zinc ash and residues shipped without a permit to submitted to the Depositary and to the parties for ratification. See Basel Convention 1989, art. 17(5). As to the overall force of the Basel Convention, article 25 specifies that " [f ] or each state ... which ratifies, accepts, approves or formally confirms this Convention ... it shall enter into force." Basel Convention 1989, art. 25(2).
94. The decision to ban export of hazardous wastes from OECD to non-OECD states was originally adopted pending implementation by Decision 11/12 of the 
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Bombay in January of 19 9 7 ;100 (2) a hazardous mixture of lead, cadmium and mercury sent to Hong Kong was ordered to be returned to Australia in October of 1997;1°1 (3) exportation of at least 8569 tons of hazardous waste to non-OECD countries in 1996; and (4) between January of 1994 and June of 1996, Australia shipped 11,328 tons of battery scrap to the Philippines.'" Regardless of whether hazardous waste trading between Australia and some poorer Asian countries continues, Australia employs stalling tactics and legal maneuvers to ignore its obligation to respect the ban. One legal manuever is claiming the continued validity of article 11 agreements under the Convention following the Ban Amendment.
B. Article 11 Agreements
Prior to the Ban Amendment, article 11 of the Basel Convention clearly allowed bilateral and multilateral export agreements between OECD and non-OECD nations as long as the importing country observed "environmentally sound" management practices.' 3 However, Greenpeace urges that the hazardous waste ban should not be circumvented using article 11 agreements."° Many OECD countries, including the United States" 0 5 and However, trade from an Annex VII state that adopted the Ban Amendment to a non-Annex VII state that adopted the amendment is clearly prohibited because both have agreed, by the terms of the Basel Convention as amended, that trade between them would "'not derogate from the environmentally sound management of hazardous wastes""I 7 in violation of article 11 of the Basel Convention. Australia is an Annex VII state that has not ratified the Ban Amendment and wishes to engage in hazardous waste trade with developing countries that have or may ratify the Ban Amendment. In this scenario, although Australia is not officially bound by the Ban Amendment, it is constrained by other language in the Basel Convention," 8 and non-Annex VII states that ratify the Ban Amendment would be placed in the awkward position of enforcing the intent of the Basel Convention in any negotiation with Australia. 1 9 This is because the law of treaties would impose the obligations of the unamended Basel Convention upon both of the parties, and because the Basel Convention imposes the responsibility to prohibit Annex VII to non-Annex VII trade squarely upon Annex VII states rather than sharing it with non-Annex VII receiving states. 1 20 Thus, by failing to ratify the Ban Amendment, and given the weak economic and political position of non-Annex VII countries, Australia will likely experience little resistence in continuing its hazardous waste trade with developing countries while it awaits the results of its economic studies.
Even assuming article 11 still applied, the original Convention specifies that agreements between OECD and non-OECD countries "shall stipulate provisions which are not less environmentally sound than those provided for by this Convention in particular taking into account the interests 115 
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of developing countries."' 2 In addition, the agreements must receive the Basel Convention Secretariat's approval as being "compatible with the environmentally sound management of hazardous wastes and other wastes as required by th[e] Convention. " " To control the apparent looseness of an "environmentally sound" standard, article 11 should be subject to the same standards governing the Convention as a whole." This would ensure that the agreement is not "incompatible with the spirit of the Basel Convention. "124 121. Basel Convention 1989, art. 11(1). "Environmentally sound management" is defined as "taking all practicable steps to ensure that hazardous wastes or other wastes are managed in a manner which will protect human health and the environment against the adverse effects which may result from such wastes." Id. 122. Basel Convention 1989, art. 11(2). To further that end, the Ad Hoc Committee on Implementation drew up a list of questions to be posited to parties to a potential article 11 agreement:
(1) Does the agreement address the control of the transboundary movement of hazardous wastes and other wastes subject to the Basel Convention? (2) Taking all practicable steps, will the management of hazardous wastes under the agreement or arrangement be such that it will protect human health and the environment against adverse effects? The "large gap" that exists in environmental technology for disposal and recycling operations between industrialized and developing nations precludes effective regulation of hazardous waste export to the latter from the former." Developing nations lack the technology to adequately control or monitor hazardous waste imports." 6 Many of the same arguments and statistics advanced above in support of the Ban Amendment may also justify the invalidation of article 11 agreements, which ignore the dangers attendant with trade between rich and poor countries. Therefore, in light of waste trade realities, any agreement between an OECD and non-OECD country allowing hazardous waste exports to the latter may constitute too great a risk to the developing nation even when subject to article 11 guidelines. However, the continued use of article 11 agreements between OECD and non-OECD nations allowing hazardous waste export to the latter is not the only argument forwarded by OECD nations eager to continue their profitable trade relationships.
C. Annex VII Expansion 27
Another effort to circumvent the ban includes statements that a non-OECD country, in order to accept hazardous waste from an OECD member, need only declare that it has "environmentally sound recycling facilities.""2 However, this criterion not only applies to the accepting nation's treatment of an exporting nation's waste, but it also imposes a "general obligation" on all parties to the Convention to dispose of waste using "environmentally sound management."' 29 Basel Action Network (BAN), a United States-based non-governmental organization that attended the Convention, stated that, "if non-OECD countries were allowed to join Annex VII, the ban would no with the "spirit" of the Convention as a whole, then article 11 agreements permitting the same activity would undermine the spirit of the Convention. 
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longer be a ban, but an open ended, largely voluntary agreement."' Environmentalists characterized the push by developed countries to expand "Annex VII as a ploy to delay implementation of the ban." 3 Australia is one of the nations "strongly in favour of opening Annex VII in order to leave the ban more 'flexible."'"
Environmentalists counter these arguments by asserting that countries should be subject to the OECD membership process before addition to Annex VII.
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On February 23, 1998, Convention delegates met in Kuching, Malaysia, to discuss conferring Annex VH status upon requesting non-OECD countries.'" Application for OECD status is conditioned upon criteria such as the applying country's economic situation and not upon its capacity to properly treat hazardous waste because economically disadvantaged countries that claim proper capacity may nonetheless be operating under economic pressure exerted by richer OECD nations.' 35 because of the possibility of economic pressure to accept hazardous waste pushed by OECD nations upon developing nations.t 39 BAN further argues that, because the development of such criteria would inspire much disagreement and enforcement difficulties, the activity would only serve to stall implementation and ratification of the ban." 4 However, this issue, along with the effect of article 11 following the Ban Amendment, remains open for debate at the Fifth Conference of the Parties in 2000.'"1 Beyond article 11 and Annex VII expansion arguments is the contention of many industries, and the countries they support, that the Ban Amendment violates international free trade provisions.
D. Criticism of the Ban from a Free Trade Perspective
Many industrial leaders and interest groups assert that the Basel Convention itself may violate the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)."
Industry groups especially emphasize the need to exclude hazardous waste destined for recycling or recovery operations. However, the Basel Secretariat, Dr. Rummel-Bulska, stresses that the Basel Convention "was negotiated not to impose trade sanctions, but to minimize the generation and movement of hazardous waste."143 However in 1995, a confidential report issued by the Australian delegation stated that there was no understanding that in signing the Convention Australia agreed to waive its free trade rights.'"
The issues are GATT's most-favored-nation (MFN) rule in article 1145 1989, art. 6(1). KUMMER, supra note 27, at 24. The information required to obtain consent includes the nature of the waste, the names of involved states and waste generators, and all other information specified in Annex VA to the Basel Convention. and GATT's article XI.' Whether the Basel Ban, in particular, violates these provisions requires further inquiry. First, if viewed as a usable good for recovery and reuse, hazardous waste and a ban on its trade would constitute a non-tariff barrier imposed by OECD nations to bar the access of "emerging economies" to a new commodity -waste.' 47 Second, a requirement that hazardous wastes be imported exclusively to other OECD nations may violate GATT's article I MFN obligation by discriminating against non-OECD convention members. 4 1 It is argued that the Ban Amendment arbitrarily and unjustifiably discriminates between OECD/Annex VII and non-OECD/non-Annex VII countries where the same conditions may exist and where a less trade-restrictive solution 149 can be substituted. 1 50 Obvious inconsistencies exist between free trade interests and placing limits on international hazardous waste trading. Both GATT and the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) contain provisions that, in theory, resolve such inconsistencies with deference to international environmental obligations.1 5 ' Article 20 of GATT provides an exception for "national measures that are, inter alia, necessary to protect human, animal, or plant life and health."' However, there is no clear test under article 20 specifying the kinds of health or environmental measures that justify yielding free trade interests for environmental concerns. 53 GATT arbitration panels .ap.harvard.edulpapers/T&E/Charnovitz/Chamovitz.html >.
146. See Charnovitz, supra note 145. Article XI of GATT forbids "prohibitions or restrictions" on the trade of "any product" as an import or export to a GATT member. CRAWFORD & SANDS, supra note 15, at 29, 31.
147. See ASANTE-DUAR & NAGY, supra note 23, at 103. In fact, both exporting and importing countries in this scenario would violate article XI of GATT if they prohibit waste trade just "because the importing country cannot manage the waste in an environmentally sound manner." Id.
148. See id.
149. An example of a less trade-restrictive solution is establishing criteria for Annex VII admission based on technical capacity rather than on OECD membership. Industrial groups accuse the European Commission (EC) of "economic imperialism" for the EC's clear support and ratification of the Basel Ban.' 5 6 However, unlike the Basel Amendment, the EC has extended the ban to additional materials not characterized as hazardous under the Convention.' 57 The Australian industrial lobby asserted pressure on its government to invest in exploring ways to weaken or revoke the Ban Amendment.' Australian scrap metals processor Peter Netchaef similarly characterized the Basel Convention as "eco-imperialism" because he believes it creates a scarcity of raw materials in developing countries while simultaneously creating an excess in developed nations, resulting in inflated prices for developing nations that "runs counter to what we are trying to do with the WTO and limits markets. (1) whether the national measure serves to protect human, animal, or plant life or health; (2) whether the measure for which the exception is invoked is necessary to protect human, animal, or plant life or health; (3) whether the measure is applied consistently with the requirements in the introductory clause to Article 20 (namely, that the measure not be applied in a manner that would constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between countries where the same conditions prevail or that would constitute a disguised restriction on international trade); and (4) 
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Globally, industry, with the aid of the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC), is trying to "kill the Basel Ban" by arguing that anything "recyclable" should not be regulated under the Convention.160 Exporting industries support this argument by contending that a rejection of certain recycling practices will cause manufacturing processes, now dependent upon receiving raw materials from abroad, to resort to increased use and exploitation of virgin resources. , 6 , Admittedly, other bilateral or multilateral treaties governing the international movement of hazardous wastes exclude materials intended for recycling or recovery from the definition of a hazardous waste even though they have different definitions of what constitutes a hazardous waste and different allowances for movement intended for recycling. 6 2 However, this argument and the others advanced in support of allowing continued hazardous waste trade recycling agreements between OECD and non-OECD nations ignore the reality that the act of recycling hazardous wastes itself poses grave health risks. 
AuSTRALIA's OPPOSITION TO THE BASEL BAN upon zinc-enriched fertilizers.' Although the Philippines, Malaysia, India, South Korea, and Brazil eventually voiced support for the ban, most of these countries expressed fears that the Ban Amendment would threaten their sources of revenue and raw materials. 167 Ban opponents also pointed out that most of the Convention delegates primarily have environmental or political backgrounds and lack the technical knowledge of metals or recycling necessary to properly evaluate the ramifications of their decisions regarding the ban. 68 However, industrial proponents appear to ignore the negative realities that continue to exist in developing nations vulnerable to OECD hazardous waste exports.
E. Need for the Ban Amendment
The most startling example of the dangers of continued tolerance for hazardous waste trade between OECD and non-OECD nations, premised on ban opponents' arguments for the need to recover raw materials, exists in India.m" Although Bharat Zinc's executive director lauds the environmentally sound hazardous waste recycling and disposal processes of observations made by witnesses in July and September of 1995 indicate otherwise."' First, witnesses noticed that in every room of the factory, workers handled the lead-containing hazardous waste without gloves or protective masks." Second, despite the executive director's claims that the lead content of the zinc being recycled is too small to warrant concern, shipping documents from the origin state (Germany) indicated that the actual lead concentrations are one hundred times higher than the executive's claims. ' Third, a factory worker specifically acknowledged the failure of management to warn any of the workers of possible health hazards.
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Finally, local activists report that city officials tested the nearby Betwa River, a drinking source for 200,000 people and found that it was contaminated with lead and cadmium. 75 Although Australia has instituted fervent efforts to stall ban ratification based in part upon its industrial trade concerns, the effects upon Australia's overall export trade remain negligible. Australia's self-reported trade statistics indicate that only .00038 percent of the country's total annual export trade is affected by the export ban. 76 Thus, arguments against the Ban Amendment in the name of free trade lack the same urgency advanced by environmentalists and developing nations in support of the ban. Given the inherent dangers to non-OECD nations from either disposing of hazardous wastes or recycling hazardous wastes and given the environmental benefits of encouraging domestic waste disposal, hazardous waste minimization, and [Vol. 9:2 recycling, the Basel ban survives both economic and environmental scrutiny.
F. Moral and Political Responsibility of Australia as a Convention Member
In Australia's statement following the adoption of the Ban Amendment at the Third Conference of the Parties, Australia specifically conveyed its desire to strengthen the purposes of the Convention, especially with regard to safeguarding countries "vulnerable" to unwanted hazardous waste (presumably, developing nations).'" The Australian representative concluded her statement by commanding those who supported the adoption of the ban decision to "contribute to the realization of its true objectives," declaring that Australia would certainly not "shirk that responsibility" in that regard., Although the representative's sentiment appeared well-meaning, Australia's continued failure to affirm its commitment to protect vulnerable developing countries by ratifying the Ban Amendment is more significant. 171 Signing an international treaty or convention like the Basel Convention "displays a willingness to cooperate at a very low price."" s Ratification of a treaty or convention, on the other hand, requires enacting national legislation that "constrain[s] the activities of certain industries in the economy."'' In addition, some countries take advantage of the time between signing and ratification to continue undesirable behavior and to attempt to forestall cooperative efforts. 182 As such, Australia may currently be taking advantage of the time period between agreeing to the consensus decision to the Ban Amendment and ratifying that amendment. Australia has signed and ratified the Basel Convention, but it is now stalling the consensus decision to ratify the Ban Amendment despite the amendment's furtherance of previously agreed upon Convention goals."
Specifically, Australia has requested It is important to note that the preamble to the Basel Convention specifically acknowledges an "increasing desire for the prohibition of transboundary movements of hazardous wastes and their disposal in other states, especially developing countries." KUMMER, supra note 27, at 63. In addition, article 15(7) of the Convention specifies the need for the Conference of the Parties to examine the Convention's effectiveness "periodically" with an eye toward adopting "a complete or partial ban on transboundary movements of hazardous wastes and other wastes in light of the latest scientific, environmental, technical and
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specification of what constitutes hazardous waste," s insisted that article 11 agreements between OECD and non-OECD nations remain valid, and attempted to establish criteria beyond OECD status that would allow additions to Annex VII.
When a state ratifies a treaty or convention, that state becomes bound by its obligations to other parties to the agreement which restrict its ability to ignore future amendments consistent with the agreement's goals. When a state ratifies a treaty, it restrains its international behavior in order to similarly restrict another state's international behavior." 8 If a state chooses to forego the burdens while receiving the benefits of such an arrangement (adherence by other states), then that state is considered a "free-rider.""' Because Australia has already ratified the Convention, certain international obligations already bind and restrict its ability to ignore future amendments to the Convention. Specifically, Australia receives the benefits of regulations forbidding the export of hazardous wastes without its consent while refusing to accept the burdens of foregoing trade in exports with developing nations.
In addition to the "free rider" problem, "a state that agrees to a treaty must execute it in good faith.' In order to execute a treaty in good faith, a ratifying state must affirmatively work to advance the spirit of the treaty. 1 88 By stalling ratification of the Ban Amendment, a necessary and integral part of the Basel Convention, Australia is violating its duty of good faith by failing to join in the effort to advance the Convention's purpose of restricting hazardous waste trade to countries unable to safely treat or dispose of it.
Article 9 of the Basel Convention, which classifies conduct amounting to illegal traffic under the Convention, may contain a legal argument defeating the continued practice of OECD to non-OECD hazardous waste trafficking. Article 9 defines the illegal traffic of hazardous waste as "any transboundary movement of hazardous wastes or other wastes: ... (e) that economic information." Basel Convention 1989, art. 15(7).
184. According to Greenpeace, any moves to stall or confuse the amendment process by arguing definitional weaknesses would "undermine the very basis of the Convention itself." Pride, supra note 62. In other words, countries had to know what was included in the definition of hazardous waste in order to implement the Convention into their national law in the first place. 89 Because the export of hazardous wastes from OECD to non-OECD countries is now prohibited by article 4A (the Ban Amendment), such movements, whether based on article 11 agreements or not, could be characterized as illegal traffic, punishable by the domestic legislation of either the exporting or importing country. 1° However, as discussed below, enforcement and policing of this solution may pose additional problems.'
V. ENFORCEMENT AND LIABILITY SCHEME LIMITATIONS
A. Enforcement and Development of Liability Protocol
Unfortunately, no matter how worthy the goals of a total ban on hazardous waste exports to developing nations, enforcement remains difficult. Often, as is the case with India, corrupt government and local officials exploit industrialized countries' pre-existing economic incentives in order to ignore waste trade restrictions.1
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The twin temptation exists for developing countries to earn a quick and much-needed buck, providing immediate benefits without comprehending the long-term health and environmental risks. ' 93 The original Convention recognized these warring motives and incentives and responded by requiring each Party to develop domestic measures "to prevent and punish conduct in contravention of the Convention." 194 Like most treaties of its kind, the Basel Convention relies primarily upon "self-policing" and political pressures to discourage 189. Basel Convention 1989, art. 9(l)(e). 190. Article 9(5) of the Basel Convention specifies that "[e]ach Party shall introduce appropriate national/domestic legislation to prevent and punish illegal traffic. The Parties shall co-operate with a view to achieving the objects of this Article." Id. art. 9(5). Note that because of economic and political pressures, lack of resources, etc., in developing nations, upon whom responsibility to police international activity will inevitably reside, the strict enforcement of an export ban upon those nations choosing to engage in such profitable illegal traffic in hazardous wastes will not likely result. See AsANTE-DUAH & NAGY, supra note 23, at 109-110.
191. It is contended that in order to successfully enforce the Ban Amendment, there must be sufficient and effective "infrastructure" in place to prevent unauthorized shipments; otherwise, greedy nations will resort to illegal trade in hazardous waste. See KUMMER, supra note 27, at 81. However, this may not be a weakness of the Convention itself, but a fact of life reflecting that "persons who stand to make millions of dollars through illegal traffic will not be easily deterred." Id. at 82 (footnote omitted). 
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breaches." 5 It also left open the stratifying concept of liability by allowing the Protocol Working Group (PWG) to specify the "appropriate rules and procedures""~ with a view to adopting "as soon as practicable." '1 The PWG met several times to discuss the appropriate scope of liability, and the form and mode of compensation under the Convention.' 98 At the first meeting of the ad hoc group, it set out four broad goals for liability protocol development:
[(1)] The victim should be protected; [(2)] The person who created the risk should, in all fairness, be held liable for the consequences of that risk; [(3)] A good liability regime should in general provide an incentive to prevent waste generation; and Last, but not least, [(4)] such a regime would enable industry to know where it stood. 99 Katharina Kummer criticizes the current Basel Convention liability scheme as failing to capture the concept of environmental reparation.' She outlines three aspects for ensuring compliance with international hazardous waste trade measures: (1) International guidelines, with an eye towards prevention, must "facilitate and support compliance" by providing a means of monitoring and verifying state and individual conduct; 2 " (2) the guidelines should seek reparation of damage -i.e., restoration of the environment and compensation to victims;' and (3) costs should be borne by the person or
